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We discuss a procedure, which should be called Lenstra’s fix, 
for producing secure RSA moduli even when the random 
number generation is very poor. 
 
RSA is uniquely vulnerable to low entropy random number 
generation. If n = pq and n’ = pq’ are two (public) moduli, then 
the computation gcd(n,n’) = p factors both moduli and totally 
compromises the security of both systems. 
 
Following a suggestion of A. K. Lenstra and his coauthors in [1] 
we present an algorithm for generating p and q that avoids this 
attack without changing the method of random number 
generation. 
 
If the probability is P that in the world two random primes p 
and p’ are generated the same, then the probability that n = n’ 
will only be P2. It is much more likely that p = p’ and q  q’, in 
which case gcd(n,n’) = p factors n and n’ 
 
The damage done when n = n’ is incomparably less. The 
owners of n and n’ can access each other’s accounts, but they 
are safe from attacks by others. Moreover, this is the same risk 
that any other cryptosystems face.  
 
The proposal is to generate p randomly and then choose q = 
f(p,k), where f(p,k) is the function 
 
f(p,k) = 1 + [22k/p].  Here [x] denotes the integer part of x. For 
example, [3.14] = 3. 
 
Algorithm 1 
1. Generate random prime p,  1+2k  < p < 2k+1. 
2. Compute q = f(p) = f(p,k). 
3. Test q for primality. 
4. If q fails to be prime, then goto 1. 
5. Put n = pq. 
The algorithm takes average time O(k2) instead of the usual 
O(k). 
 
We require the following properties of f(p,k): 
Theorem 1 
1. If 1+2k < p < 2k+1, then (1a) f(p,k) < 2k and (1b) f(p,k) > 2k-1. 
2. The function f(p) = f(p,k) is bijective in the range 1+2k < p < 
2k+1.  In other words, if f(p) = f(p’), then p = p’. 
 
Theorem 2 
If (1) and (2) are true, and if n = pq, n’=p’q’ and gcd(n,n’) > 1, 
then n = n’.  
 
Proof 
Suppose that gcd(n,n’) > 1. 
Case 1. If p = p’, then q = f(p) = f(p’) = q’, and therefore n = n’. 
Case 2. If q = q’, then by (2) p = p’ and therefore n = n’. 
Case 3. If p = q’ or p’ = q. This cannot happen because by (1) all 
of the q’s are less than 2k and all of the p’s are greater than 2k 
by assumption. So no q can be equal to any p. 
 
Proof of theorem 1 
We first prove (1a), that f(p,k) < 2k.   
 
Case 1. 
If  22k/p < 2k – 1, then f(p) = 1 + [22k/p] < 1 + 22k/p < 2k, which 
is (1a). 
 
Case 2. If 22k/p > 2k – 1. Then 22k/p > 2k – 1, since 22k/p is not 
an integer. Multiplying by p we obtain p(2k – 1) < 22k.   
Hence p(2k – 1) <  22k – 1.  Hence p < (22k – 1)/(2k – 1) = 2k + 1.   
But by the hypothesis p > 2k + 1, so case 2 cannot occur. 
 
Proof of (1b), that f(p) > 2k-1. 
Now f(p) = 1+[22k/p] > 22k/p,  and by the hypothesis p < 2k+1.  
Hence f(p) >  22k/2k+1 = 2k-1. 
 
Proof  of (2) 
Suppose f(p,k) = f(q,k).  Then [22k/p] = [22k/q] = r, say. Hence r 
= 22k/p -  = 22k/q - ’,  where 0 < , ’ < 1.  
Hence |22k/q – 22k/p| = | - ’| < 1.  Multiplying by pq we get 
|22kp – 22kq| < pq. But by the hypothesis p < 2k+1, and by (1a)  
q < 2k.  Hence |22kp – 22kq| < pq < 22k+1,  and |p-q| < 2. But p and 
q are odd.  Hence p = q.  
 
Remarks 
The tacit assumption in all of this is of course that everyone 
generating keys will use this system.  
 
Let’s consider what happens if the routers made by Company A 
use the above algorithm, but the routers of Company B just 
choose p and q independently. 
 
If company A issues n = pq, then q = f(p,k), and company B 
produces independent p’ and q’, then the probability that p’=p 
is P and the probability that q = q’ is also P, and gcd(n,n’) 
factors both moduli with probability 2P(1-P) as was originally 
the case. 
 
You face a similar failure even if the two companies use the 
above scheme, but with different functions. Fortunately there 
is probably not much choice in what function to use.  Company 
B could of course  use g(p,k) = B + [22k/p] for B  1, but this 
would not be any easier to implement or any more efficient.  
 
But if  everybody would all agree to use the same function it 
would solve the problem. 
 
 
Implementation Issues 
For the sake of implementing the multiprecision arithmetic, we 
point out that f(p,k) = 1+[22k/p]  can be written in the 
equivalent form 
 
f(p,k) = {22k + 1 – (22k mod p)}/p. 
 
A. K. Lenstra et. al. suggested the slightly different function 
 
f(p,k) = {22k-1 + 1 – (22k-1 mod p)}/p.  We needed to modify 
theirs in order to produce a manageable proof of (1) above, so 
that all of the p’s would be greater than all of the q’s. 
 
Does factoring get easier? 
In a 1998 paper [2] with on RSA key generation, A. K. Lenstra 
discusses a variety of functions of this type and presents 
credible evidence that the known factoring algorithms will not 
be able to factor pf(p) any more easily than pq when p and q 
are independent. 
 
Can key generation be made O(k)? 
Also in [2] Lenstra discusses functions that generate the keys 
in time O(k), but it is pretty clear that these function cannot be 
made bijective, so they won’t work for the present purpose. 
They generate p, compute f(p) and then search forward f(p)+2, 
f(p)+4,… until reaching g(p) = f(p) + m, the first prime. Any p’ 
for which f(p) < f(p’) < f(p) + m will satisfy g(p’) = g(p), so there 
is no hope of making g(p) bijective. 
 
Another suggestion for making more secure moduli 
Without changing how the random numbers are generated, 
greater security is achieved by using algorithm 2 below to 
generate p, rather than algorithm 3 below. 
 
 
Algorithm 2 
1. Generate random odd p. 
2. Test p for primality. 
3. If p fails to be prime goto 1. 
 
Algorithm 3 
1. Generate random odd p. 
2. Test p, p+2, p+4, … for primality until a prime is found. 
 
Algorithm 3 behaves particularly badly when p is followed by 
an unusually long stretch of composite numbers. This may 
account for some of the bad keys found in the experiment of 
Lenstra et al [1].  
  
 
Summary 
1.The use of such a function solves the problem, but only if 
everyone uses it. 
2. Key generation takes time O(k2) instead of O(k). 
3. The resulting moduli seem to be equally hard to factor. 
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